Abstract-Privacy, Anonymity, pseudonymity are the debatable terms which on one angle restrict the rights but on other angle open doors for malicious activity.This paper proposes design for a pseudonymised communication which is optimal solution for the privacy issues, where the real identity is hidden from the outside world by using blind signature in a different way of group communication.The protocol is deployed and analysed in extreme environment of Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN), which is overlay on the top of traditional Internet which provides end to end connectivity and characterized with long delay and disruption. A telemedicine application of rural area network is explored to provide source anonymity.The protocol is finally analysed using Dolev Yao model with two different cases and it preserves the original identity of the node.
INTRODUCTION
The Internet performed well by interconnecting many devices on common homogenous protocol stack TCP/IP across the globe to provide connectivity, but due to the immense need of Internet connectivity in all areas of our day to day life, it bend on knees when the challenge environments i.e. deep space communication, tracking animals, meteorological data transfer and many more are the stakeholders, The reason behind it is lacking of end to end connectivity and small round trip time.
Delay Tolerant Networks(DTN) [1] take the responsibility when Internet stops functioning, by providing end to end connectivity using the concept of custody transfer, where each node accepts the message, stores in case of unavailability of link and then forwards subject to link availability. Preservation of privacy in DTN communication is fairly researched topic, a methodology is needed which can comply with DTN's restricted architecture. Traditional digital signature which is used for integrity and non repudiation (assuring the recipient about the identity of the sender and integrity of the message) leaves the footprint of the signer (originator if the message), which can be traced easily. This paper defines the architecture for pseudonymised communication in DTN, where a pseudonym can be used for communication instead of the real identity of the user, and that pseudonym can be verified if needed. The significant achievements of our protocol design include.
I. Pseudonymised identity by using Blind Signature in a unique way of group communication with two message exchanges and without trusting any entity. A pseudonym ceritifcate based on the pseudonymised identity.
II. We analyzed our protocol using a strong adversary model called Dolev Yao adversary model, and still our protocol did not reveal the real identity.
The rest of the paper is organized as, Section II gives some basic knowledge about DTN and its security architecture, Section III elaborates the concepts of privacy, anonymity and pseudonyms and its importance in communication network, section IV defines basic algorithm of blind signature, section V explains the design of our pseudonymised protocol with algorithm, section VI reveals a comprehensive threat analysis, finally Section VII concludes the paper and direction for future research work.
II. DTN AND SECURITY ARCHITETURE
When traditional Internet down on knees in stressful environment where end to end connectivity cannot be assumed then DTN takes the lead [2] . DTN is a store and forward overlay network on the top of TCP/IP [3] [4] . DTN is characterized by long delays, intermittent connectivity, asymmetric data rates and high error rates. The above mentioned properties are being achieved by DTN using store and forward message switching technique where every hop in the network accepts the custody of the packet and forward the message upon link availability [5] .
Node
Router Gateway Bundle is the transmission data unit used in DTN likewise packet/message in traditional Internet. Bundle layer is set between transport and application layer in TCP/IP protocol stack, which provides the functionalities of DTN. Bundle Protocol [6] defines the format of the bundle. The above figure-I pictorially represents DTN architecture. The architecture proposed here is a message based overlay architecture for interoperability between and among challenged networks named "Delay Tolerant Networking (DTN) Architecture". Messages aggregates are known as "Bundles" and are routed by "Bundle Forwarders" or "Bundle Gateways". A DTN node is a device which can send and receive bundles and a DTN specific router is device which makes the decision to forward the bundles to successfully deliver it to its destination. Unlike other network routers, the DTN router supports bundle layer and can have optional application layer as well.
Bundle security specifications [7] provide some security blocks (BAB, PIB, PCB, ECB) in order to achieve the confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and non repudiation. The participants in the secure communication in DTN networks are as follows in figure II.
In the diagram we have shown a DTN network containing 4 bundle nodes named BN1 to BN4. BN2 and BN3 are gateways while BN1 and BN4 are DTN nodes. BN1 generates a bundle destined for BN4. BN1 forwards the packet to BN2. BN2 then forwards the packet to BN3 thus becoming the first forwarder and BN3 becomes the first intermediate receiver. BN3 forwards the packet to BN4 which is the final destination. BN1 being originator if adds the security blocks to the bundle, then is called the security source as well. The security source can be different from the original source for example, if BN2 adds the security blocks to bundle instead of BN1, then BN2 will be the security source and BN1 will be original source. Similarly, If BN4 processes all the security blocks processing, then BN4 will be security destination or BN3 can be security destination by processing the security blocks on behalf of BN4 and BN4 can be original destination. The network area along path from security source to security destination is called "security zone. DTN security is hot wide area of research ranging from key management, access control, preventing DoS attacks, privacy/anonymity [8] .
III. PRIVACY, ANONYMITY AND PSEUDONYMITY
There is no standard definition of the subjected terms and even till 1985 there was no meaning defined in the dictionaries of Asia pacific region, however the work in [9] defines the terms in a sophisticated way. Privacy defines boundaries around the subject attributes and restricting the rights to use, manipulate and share those attributes. Anonymity is defined as when all the requirements of the privacy meet in a certain way so that nobody can identify the subject in a lot. While pseudonymity is to preserve the privacy but at the same time is accountable in case if malicious activity is being performed. Pseudonym systems allow user to interact with multiple entities anonymously using falsely name i.e. pseudonyms, which cannot be linked with the real identity of the user. There is no possibility of providing absolute anonymity and at the same time dangerous so in lieu of malicious activities.
Preserving privacy in a communication network by providing either pseudonymised or anonymised techniques is the core requirement of any technology i.e. Internet, MANETS, WSN and many more. In literature a lot of techniques were defined i.e. MIXNET, Onion Routing (OR), Identity Based Cryptography (IBC), threshold cryptography [10] , which up to some extent achieves either the pseudonymised or anonymised communication under some assumptions. But traditional solution to the problem does not work well in DTN.
Privacy is a value shared by most human societies, in order to achieve it a system is needed to provide anonymity. In DTN where connectivity is itself a big issue, talking about privacy and anonymity seems outlawed, but such an open and lose network environment, where boundaries are hard to define, can encourage malicious nodes more actively then a well connected mature network. A number of protocols are being established to provide anonymity with combination of Public & Secret Key Cryptography. But due to the unique nature of DTN traditional security measures do not work efficiently. Kate et al [11] defined state of the art of anonymous protocol based on Identity Based Cryptography (IBC), in which the public keys can be identity (DOB, email etc) of the entity and by this way created on the fly, which is suitable for disconnected network like DTN. In that paper pseudonym is used as the identity of the node, generated by the node itself. Kate defined a complete anonymous architecture for local and long distance communication but with the assumptions of trusting on gateways, sender and receiver knows about the real identity of each other, and heavily cryptographic functions in pseudonym generation, registration and later in communication phase are the debatable issue. The proposed protocol design overcomes all these assumptions in a very simple way.
The two recent researches [12] , [13] on anonymity and privacy took the issue in a quite different way but somehow both researches converged at same point. In [12] the idea is based on a threshold pivot scheme, where the concepts of threshold cryptography, secrete sharing and group communication were used. Alice joins any group and generates a onetime secrete share kx and divides it (kx=s1, s2, s3….sn) into the number of nodes through which this message will go, and encrypt it with a group secrete share (Gssx), on the way every node decrypts its share (i.e. s1) and the one who can regenerate the kx is the pivot node, which can see the destination address and forward the message to the destination. Here we want to highlight several issues e.g. how nodes join the group i.e. if malicious node is a part of group, no privacy is preserved between the pivot node and destination, attacks on pivot node as he knows about the destination, and last but not the least no analysis is being carried out of the cryptographic functions applied. In [13] same group communication is applied but in a different way, no cryptographic analysis is being showed, considering routing more than security.
The rest of paper concentrates on our design and particularly focuses on pseudonymised network. In [14] we defined a scenario for telemedicine example in rural area network, where DTN is the only mean of communication because of no suitable infrastructure available. A DTN bus which carries data from village to city is considered as a data mule. The details are contained in our previous research work [14] . In this section we demonstrated that anonymity is a core requirement in these sorts of environments, where a leakage of some important patient identity can cause turmoil. Here we need to allow nodes to use identifiers which are routable, verifiable but at the same time pseudonymised. The following figure-III showed the scenario to make it easy for the readers. Section V will more narrow down the scenario and define a protocol to achieve pseudonymity.
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IV. BLIND SIGNATURE
Blind signature was first introduced by David Chaum [15] , defined as to sign the message without knowing the participant about the content of message. Suppose Alice wants to sign a message m, but does not want Bob to know about the content of message, so Alice generates a blinding factor r, and encrypts with the public key of Bob (signer), Bob upon receiving signs the message without knowing the message contents and sends back to Alice, Alice applies the unblinding factor r -1 , and gets m signed by Bob, which is simple RSA digital signature. The following figure-IV expresses the basic algorithm of blind signature. There are many variants of blind signature i.e. fair blind signature with or without random oracles, partial blind signature, and invariable partially blind signature. The main differences among all these variants are the sharing of knowledge between the signer and node. In simple blind signature the signer does not know about the message content, partially blind signature divided the message into two parts, one part known by both and one only by the node, invariable partially blind signature is for reusing blind signature and lastly fair blind signature is used if revoking of anonymity is needed [16] .
V. PSEUDONYMISED PROTOCOL DESIGN
Humans in crowd are anonymous but not totally, and this is, what we want to achieve from our protocol, we want to use such an identifier called pseudonym, which should generate in a way that hides the real identity of the user in a crowd but at the same time law enforcement agency can dig out if necessary. Considering figure-III where a user in urban area wants to send its medical record to the doctor setting in rural area but wants to hide its identity. So we consider that this user is part of some virtual group which comprises of many nodes because it would be hard to disguise the source identity in the network if it is the only source, in other words to hide the identities of 1 to 1 communication is almost impossible. We divide the design section into subsections, section A defines all the assumptions made for the design of the protocol, section B elaborates the message exchanges for getting pseudonymised identity, section C outcome is the pseudonymised certificate based on already generated pseudonymised identity, section D analyze our protocol in lieu of already researched techniques and finally section E elaborates DTN specific effects on our protocol.
A. Assumptions 1. Public key of signer s is e, and its private key is d. 2. G1ID is the ID of the group1. 3. Every node in the group knows the public/private key pair of the G1. 4. Every node in the group including adversary knows the public key of s. 5. Every node can receive the bundle sent by s by applying its private key, but only n1 can apply unblinding factor, which we will see in later section. 6. Nodes per group are assumed to be n here, and anyone can join the group without any authentication, at the same time leave without affecting other nodes. 7. Every node know the public key PKCA of the Certificate Authority CA.
B. Pseudonymised Identity
Referring to figure-V narrow down from figure-III, there are n nodes in the virtual group G1, and among them n1 want to send a bundle to n 2, but before sending n1 wants to Here the identity is secrete known to the node only, and used for the first time, there is no public/private key pair associated with this ID. n1 creates a bundle by randomly generating a blinding factor r and encrypting it with the public key of the signer s, multiplying this tuple with its original ID, putting the group ID "G1ID" as a source and signer s ID as destination and send all this to the signer s. s get no information from this bundle as r is randomly generated function and e is public key which is again random, and this randomness multiplies with ID making it un understandable.
s signs the message with its private key and sends back to the group G1ID, n1 receives it , applying the unblinding factor r -1 it gets the original ID signed by the private key of s, which becomes its pseudonymised ID.
The algorithm we used here is blind signature already explained, but with some modification, instead of message m we used the real identity n1ID of the node. The source address of M1 is kept as G1ID, so the signer s unable to identify the specific node e.g. n1 in the G1 group. At the end we get the normal digital signature on ID (n1ID d mod n), which we used a pseudonymised id (nP1= n1ID d mod n) in our rest of communication.
C. Pseudonymised Certificate
Pseudonymised Certificate PC is certificate based on the already generated pseudonymised ID in section B of the protocol. Here n1 with nP1 generate a public/private key pair PKnp1 and SKnP1 and request to the Certificate Authority (CA) for a PC. The CA generates the PC upon verifying nP1 from the signer s. The actual message exchanges are as fallows.
In step-1 n1 encrypt the pseudonymised ID and corresponding public key of n1 with the public key of the CA for PC request. In step-2 CA generate the certificate PC in which pseudonymised ID is included with the public key and send back to n1 encrypted with n1 public key. Now n1 can make the nP1 public as it posses the PC for it and anyone can authenticate nP1 from CA.
D. Analysis
We defined very generic and simple approach which can be applied to any networking technologies. Protocols defined in literature till now, the registration phase of pseudonym is classified as offline, but in our protocol registration phase is online, where adversary has full access to the communication, which can be analyzed in threat analysis phase later on. Once the node gets the PC, afterward no encryption is needed because our scope is to hide the identities not the message body itself. Our protocol performed very few cryptographic functions, so computation cost is less. The protocol design is scalable enough that nodes leave or join the network does not affect communication performance. The protocol not only preserve pseudonymised communication on application layer but also on IP and MAC layer as this is the basic property of group communication. Here s sends the bundle back to the IP multicast and MAC multicast addresses later on. In the case when n1 receive two different responds (multicast) from signer s , the one which gives the result of signed ID by applying the unblinding function is the right destined message and the other message can simply be discarded. Though this approach has some performance issues as every node receive every message and can degrade network performance but this out of our scope.
E. Pseudonymised protocol in DTN
In this section we investigate our protocol in the extreme environment of DTN where delay and disruption can occur. Mixing is the technique which is normally adopted for providing anonymity. A mix is a store and forward node which accepts messages up to certain threshold and forwards to next node in random order. Our protocol in case of intermittent conectivity achives the mixing but with no extra overhead, which makes harder for the adversary to launch traffic analysis attacks.
DTN connectivity by itself pose a big problem, so maximum utilization of connectivity is achieved in our protocol by generating pseudonymised identity with only two messages exchange.
If a trust is build on a specific node, and that node got disconected and later on hijacked by malacious node, in this case communication with that node assuming previous trust gives a free lunch to adversary. But our protocol is free from the trust constrain , so disruption in the network does not effect our protocol performance.
Our routing is based on the group level, the scenario presented is supposed with one virtual group G1 with n nodes but these groups can also be up to n. The benefit of group communication here in DTN is that if a source and destination belonged to the same group then it can bypass the DTN gateway (normally communication in DTN is based on gateways and regions). But also the probability to identify the source node is low as protocol needs to protect itself from inside malicious node. If nodes belong to different groups then the responsibility of routing protocol is to deliver the bundle to the destination group, which makes the work of routing protocol easier.
VI. THREAT ANALYSIS
Cryptographic and anonymous protocols are sequential exchanges of messages between participating nodes, the purpose is to achieve the security goal, here our goal and objective is to how can we hide the real identity of the source node. Dolev Yao model [17] is a strong adversary model which can overhear, intercept, synthesis, replay any message. The only function that the adversary cannot perform is decryption of the message without the appropriate key. We examine our protocol in sight of Dolev Yao model on the basis of two different cases. In our protocol adversary is part of our network and it has the public key of all nodes and the signer s. 1. When the adversary is between the node n1 and the signer s during the registration or generation phase of pseudonymised identity (refer figure-VI .r e mod n (ed=1) M2= ID.r e mod n ---------------------------------(1) Eq.1 shows that the adversary gets the same random value which n1 generates, which gives no useful information about the n1ID.
n1 is anonymous to s, because the message comes from the group not the individual node, in normal blind signature the message comes from individual node, which leaks information about the identity of the node to the signer s.
In the second case, when adversary is part of the group, and reacts as n1, so the maximum he can achieve is the eq.1.
If malicious nodes join the group so adds more anonymity features to the group because it would be hard to identify 1 in 1000 rather than 1 in 100, but at the same times this node can perform unlawful activities under the umbrella of pseudonymised identity, but law enforcement agency can easily reach the group. DTN is featured with long delays and intermittent connectivity; we characterized the eavesdropper as weak and strong; DTN is multi hop network and message is delivered hop by hop with custody transfer report. If the link between the node and participant is not directly available and message has to buffer at some hops. In this case it produces some natural delay which weakens the ability of the eavesdropper to get the global picture of the network, it can sniff between the node and intermediate node and in DTN messages pass through hundred of nodes, which even complex the job of adversary.
Strong eavesdropper is one, who can track the message from initiator to the responder, but assuming this type of eavesdropper is not realistic and even how much information it can get is hard to estimate or evaluate.
Traffic analysis attack in case of weak eavesdropper is possible but in case of strong eavesdropper it would toughen the job. DoS attacks are possible on our protocol as the malicious can join the group to launch attack on a targeted node by sending bunch of messages.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Privacy is an extremely important issue to be address, and absolute anonymity is not possible to preserve the privacy, a pseudonym is the mid way and panacea. This paper raised the issue of source anonymity in telemedicine application of rural area network. Delay Tolerant Network is the possible solution for this type of stressed environment where no infrastructure is deployed and communication via traditional Internet or other technologies is either cost driven or unfeasible. In this paper we presented a design for pseudonymised communication in Delay Tolerant Networks. The approach is unique in a way that it does not depend on any entity for generating the pseudonyms. The protocol performed very less cryptographic functions and achieved a pseudonymised ID in two messages exchanges, on the basis of which pseudonymised certificate is achieved without disclosing the real identity of the node. The blind signature is used to provide source anonymity but we used blind signature in a virtual group environment. For the first time regarding blind signature and we deployed a strong adversary model Dolev Yao model and mathematical proof that our protocol does not leak any information about the real identity of the node.
Our future work involves formal analysis of the protocol in communication Sequential Process (CSP) by writing the full protocol with adversary and simulating the CSP code using Failure Divergence Model (FDR) for checking properties of anonymity and pseudonymity. This work will also be supported with simulation results using Opportunistic Network Simulator (ONE) for the evaluation of networking issues and parameter such as packet delivery ratio etc. This work will also be extended by analyzing the number of nodes per group and show that the probability of identifying a node in a group and making an optimal standard for nodes per group which can not affect network performance. In general, with continue research interest in blind signature, more efficient solution for anonymity in DTN might become possible for future.
